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Abstract
We answer several questions that have been Frequently Asked about QBism. These
remarks (many of them lighthearted) should be considered supplements to more sys-
tematic treatments by the authors and others.
bQBism \"kyü-­bi-z@m\ n. an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the ideas
of agent and experience are fundamental. A “quantum measurement” is an act
that an agent performs on the external world. A “quantum state” is an agent’s
encoding of her own personal expectations for what she might experience as a
consequence of her actions. Moreover, each measurement outcome is a personal
event, an experience specific to the agent who incites it. Subjective judgments
thus comprise much of the quantum machinery, but the formalism of the theory
establishes the standard to which agents should strive to hold their expectations,
and that standard for the relations among beliefs is as objective as any other
physical theory.
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As proponents of an interpretation of quantum mechanics, we are accustomed to en-
countering puzzlement. We know that this is an unusual, perhaps even disreputable
activity for professional physicists to engage in. One of the authors came to QBism
from quantum chemistry, and the other from nonequilibrium statistical physics. We are
here largely because we sought to apply the same habits to quantum foundations that
we would find virtuous in any other field of physics: separating principles from conve-
nient conventions, reformulating old mathematics in new ways to make a different set
of questions easy, maintaining a healthy disregard for philosophers’ judgments about
what is impossible. Yet even a mostly ordinary upbringing can lead to a surprising
place.
What follows is our attempt to take the questions we have encountered, select those
that have been posed in good faith, and provide responses that summarize QBist think-
ing on those topics. We have tried to be serious without being dour. Finding quantum
foundations important at all may be controversial among physicists, potentially more
so than any specific choice of interpretation. More shocking still is the suggestion that
the material be approached with a sense of fun and adventure.
1. Why did you change from Quantum Bayesianism to QBism?
There are too many different kinds of “Bayesian”.
2. Why do you call QBism “local”?
That which happens, happens locally; that which changes “spookily” is not physi-
cal.
3. What does it feel like to be in a quantum superposition?
Nothing — wave functions are my personal expectations for the consequences of
my freely chosen actions.
4. Isn’t it just solipsism?
No. The existence of an external world is a central postulate of QBism.
5. Isn’t it just the Copenhagen interpretation?
No. There are considerable differences between the views of each of the founders
and QBism.
6. Why does the interpretation of probability theory matter?
Although it’s the kind of question physicists like to gloss over, it’s an inextricable
part of making progress.
7. What is the meaning of the double-slit experiment in QBism?
It’s a canonical, helpful example of probabilities meshing together in a nonclassical
way, but it isn’t the deepest such.
8. Doesn’t the PBR theorem prove QBism wrong?
No. It just doesn’t apply to QBism, and even its inventors don’t think that it does.
9. Is QBism about the Bayes rule?
No. In QBism, being “Bayesian” is about something more fundamental.
10. What technical questions have been motivated by QBism?
Examples include quantum de Finetti theorems for “unknown states” and “un-
known processes” as well as compatibility criteria for quantum states. Most re-
2
cently, QBism has prompted work on Symmetric Informationally Complete quan-
tum measurements (SICs). The lessons they teach about how probability works in
quantum theory keep growing more interesting.
11. Isn’t quantum probability just classical probability but noncommuta-
tive?
A careful analysis reveals that one has to dig deeper than that.
12. Doesn’t decoherence solve quantum foundations?
Momentarily deferring a question is not the same as answering it.
13. Is QBism like Rovelli’s “Relational Quantum Mechanics”?
In a few ways, yes, but there are important differences and it’s hard to pin down
RQM on some significant points.
14. Why do QBists prefer de Finetti over Cox?
The Cox approach is too loaded in the direction of thinking of inferences regarding
hidden variables.
15. Why so much emphasis on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces?
It’s a good place to look for the essential quantum mysteries.
16. Aren’t the probabilities in quantum physics objective?
Ultimately, probabilities just can’t work that way. But that’s fine, because physi-
cists don’t need them to.
17. Don’t you have to define “agent”?
No, for the same reason you don’t have to in any standard decision-theoretic
situation.
18. Where and when does the agent end and the external world begin?
What matters is that you are consistent about the notion of an agent within each
scenario you try to reason about.
19. Does QBism lose the “explanatory power” of other interpretations?
Not with respect to a reasonable notion of “explanation”.
20. Aren’t probabilities an insufficient representation of beliefs?
They might not be sufficient in the final analysis, but we don’t need them to be.
21. What does unitary time evolution mean in QBism?
Mathematically and conceptually, unitaries are conditional probabilities, used in
a way that respects the Born Rule.
22. What do the recent Extended Wigner’s Friend thought-experiments
imply for QBism?
So far, the mini-field of wrapping a Wigner’s Friend scenario around a Bell-type
test is still too undeveloped to go beyond what QBism has already learned from
Wigner and Bell.
23. Is QBism compatible with the Many Worlds Interpretation?
No, our view and those of the Everettian creeds are genuinely contradictory.
24. What are good things to read about QBism?
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, von Baeyer’s book, and others.
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1 Why did you change from Quantum Bayesian-
ism to QBism?
Originally, the Q stood for Quantum and the B for Bayesian. The former is still true.
Back in the 1990s and early 2000s, the term “Quantum Bayesianism” was service-
able. However, it had its issues. For one thing, nobody was consistent on whether to
capitalize the Q: Those who called themselves Quantum Bayesians preferred it upper-
case, so that neither half of the term had undue emphasis over the other, but try to
convince a copy editor of that simple point! More importantly, there are many varieties
of Bayesianism, and plenty of self-declared Bayesians disagreed in fundamental ways
with the particular variety that our school found necessary for quantum physics. For
a while, N. David Mermin joked that the B should stand for Bruno de Finetti [1], and
Chris Fuchs suggested that the QB was like KFC, which once stood for “Kentucky
Fried Chicken” but is now a stand-alone trademark [2].
More recently, we found a way to expand the B that we had never anticipated
— a rolling, Lewis-Carroll-esque word: bettabilitarianism [3]. This word comes, of all
places, from the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. To quote Louis Menand’s history of
American pragmatism, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America:
‘The loss of certainty’ is a phrase many intellectual historians have used to
characterize the period in which Holmes lived. But the phrase has it back-
ward. It was not the loss of certainty that stimulated the late-nineteenth-
century thinkers with whom Holmes associated; it was the discovery of un-
certainty. Holmes was, in many respects, a materialist. He believed, as he
put it, that “the law of the grub . . . is also the law for man.” But he was not
entirely a determinist, because he did not think that the course of human
events was fixed . . . . Complete certainty was an illusion; of that he was cer-
tain. There were only greater and lesser degrees of certainty, and that was
enough. It was, in fact, better than enough; for although we always want to
reduce the degree of uncertainty in our lives, we never want it to disappear
entirely, since uncertainty is what puts the play in the joints. Imprecision,
the sportiveness, as it were, of the quantum, is what makes life interesting
and change possible. Holmes liked to call himself a “bettabilitarian”: we
cannot know what consequences the universe will attach to our choices, but
we can bet on them, and we do it every day.
A QBist declares, “I strive to be the very model of a Quantum Bettabilitarian!”
We have occasionally seen manglings like “QBian” and even “Qubian”. These spoil
the pun of QBism and are thus strongly deprecated.
2 Why do you call QBism “local”?
A journey of a thousand perspective shifts begins with a single step. In this case, the
first step is to realize why the scenarios trotted out to imply “quantum nonlocality”
actually don’t [4]. The standard argument for “nonlocality” rests upon entanglement.
Conjure up a pair of qubits, for example, assign to them a maximally entangled state
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and ship one of the pair off to Mars. Upon measuring the qubit left on Earth, “the
state of the qubit on Mars changes instantaneously”. But this is not a physical change
of any property of a material object! Compare this with classical electromagnetism:
In that subject, if we could toggle a quantity at a distance but only in ways that
could not effect a transmission of information, we’d have no hesitation in calling that
quantity unphysical — an artifact, we’d say, of choosing a gauge that does not respect
relativistic causality. QBism says that the right way to interpret quantum theory is to
take this helpful and uncontroversial move seriously. When Alice measures her Earth-
bound qubit, what changes for its partner on the red planet? Only Alice’s expectations
for what might happen to Alice herself, if she were to make the journey and intervene
upon that qubit.
The fact that nature violates Bell inequalities is reason to reject the hypothesis used
to derive those inequalities, “local realism”. But when we decide to adopt non-(local
realism), we have a choice of how to clear those parentheses. We can put the non- on
either half, and when we consider the highly specialized character of what is actually
meant by realism in this context, keeping the local turns out to be the natural move.
Another way of saying this is that adopting quantum theory does not force us to revise
the notions of “causal structure” developed in classical physics, such as the conceptual
tool of Minkowski spacetime.
3 What does it feel like to be in a quantum
superposition?
A QBist affirms, “My quantum states are mine, your quantum states are yours. If
someone else considers a quantum system containing me and ascribes to that system
a quantum superposition state, so be it. That is their quantum state assignment. It
doesn’t make sense for me to assign myself a quantum state if a quantum state is an
encoding of my own beliefs for the outcomes of my freely chosen actions.” If something
feels off about this answer, consider whether you are assuming that there is a “correct”
— i.e., purely physically mandated — quantum state in this scenario. For a QBist,
there is never such a quantum state just as in personalist probability theory there is
never an ontologically “correct” probability distribution. The answer to the question
“What does it feel like to be in a quantum superposition?” is the same as the answer
to the question “What does it feel like to be in someone else’s probability distribution
about me?”.
Incidentally, this is one problem with the no-go argument made by Frauchiger and
Renner, originally intended to rule out what they called “single-world interpretations”
of quantum theory [5]. This argument, as well as others closely related to it [6], all
at some point make an assumption that amounts to an agent putting herself into a
quantum superposition. Ultimately, this makes no more sense than trying to crawl
inside a probability distribution and live there.
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4 Isn’t it just solipsism?
On the issue of solipsism, QBism stands with Martin Gardner [7]:
The hypothesis that there is an external world, not dependent on human
minds, made of something, is so obviously useful and so strongly confirmed
by experience down through the ages that we can say without exaggerating
that it is better confirmed than any other empirical hypothesis. So useful
is the posit that it is almost impossible for anyone except a madman or a
professional metaphysician to comprehend a reason for doubting it.
For a QBist, the basic subject matter of quantum theory is an agent’s interactions
with the outside world; the formalism of quantum theory makes no sense otherwise.
Were there no systems outside the QBist’s mind, there would be no interface between
agent and world, and quantum theory would have no subject matter. QBism is a
full-throated rejection of metaphysical solipsism.
Someone once asked us, “Where is the real world in such a view?” The real world is
exactly where it always has been. It is the world in which our species evolved. It is the
world in which we grow and strive and protest, where we learn by individual experience
— including our encounters with the words of others — the pain of heartbreak and the
utility of the Lorentz transform. It has conditioned our calculus of expectations, even
as those expectations themselves remain intensely personal.
To a QBist, “measurement” is that variety of interaction which physics understands
best, precisely because experiments are actions whose potential outcomes we can cata-
logue. Measurements are to quantum physics what “model organisms” are to biology.
Why do developmental biologists know so much about zebrafish? Because their em-
bryos are transparent! But life flourishes on, unanalysed, beyond our microscopes. Far
from being solipsistic, QBism recognises just how little of nature we have managed to
touch.
It is true that QBists refuse to make an upfront definite claim about what the stuff
of the world is. How then, can they have a consistent doxastic interpretation?1 This
is accomplished by being clear on what quantum information is actually information
about: A quantum state encodes a user’s beliefs about the experience they will have
as a result of taking an action on an external part of the world. Among several reasons
that such a position is defensible is the fact that any quantum state, pure or mixed, is
equivalent to a probability distribution over the outcomes of an informationally com-
plete measurement [8]. Accordingly, QBists say that a quantum state is conceptually
no more than a probability distribution. Okay, fine, but what is the stuff of the world?
QBism is so far mostly silent on this issue, but not because there is no stuff of the
world. The character of the stuff is simply not yet understood well enough. Answering
this question is the goal, rather than the premise.
Is this an unacceptable weakness of the interpretation? Well, that’s a matter of
opinion, but ours is that it is not. Must we demand that a complete ontology be laid
out before one’s ramblings graduate to the status of an “interpretation”? If taken
1A brief note on useful terminology: epistemic refers to knowledge and information, doxastic to belief,
and ontic to brute elements of physical reality.
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to the extreme, this is clearly unfair: One might claim that no one has a qualifying
interpretation because we don’t have a successful theory for quantum gravity and so
every proposed ontology necessarily fails. More practically, feeling pressured to commit
to an ontology prematurely may leave physicists unable to imagine one which departs
sufficiently from classical intuitions. Why not see if the right ontology can be teased out
from the formalism itself and a principled stance on the meaning of its more familiar
components (such as probability distributions)?
In fact, QBism has had ontological aspirations ever since the beginning. (It’s hard
to have ontological aspirations for a theory if you think you’d have to be a solipsist to
hold it.) There are structural realist and neutral pluralist elements in QBism, and there
seems to be a process or event ontology underlying it all, somewhere in a spectrum of
things suggested by William James, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, and John
Archibald Wheeler [9]. The stuff of the world is the becomings of the world. However,
we really don’t believe we’ll be able to say anything in proper detail until we get the
quantum formalism into a better shape. (That’s what all the SIC research described
in §10 is about.) So, from this perspective, QBism is a project.
Mermin [10] argues,
QBists are often charged with solipsism: a belief that the world exists only
in the mind of a single agent. This is wrong. Although I cannot enter
your mind to experience your own private perceptions, you can affect my
perceptions through language. When I converse with you or read your books
and articles in Nature, I plausibly conclude that you are a perceiving being
rather like myself, and infer features of your experience. This is how we can
arrive at a common understanding of our external worlds, in spite of the
privacy of our individual experiences.
This leads us to an important topic: communication between agents. What does the
idea of agents comparing notes mean when we interpret quantum mechanics as a single-
user theory? Consider an agent Alice. She can use quantum mechanics as a “manual
for good living”, a way to organize her expectations while navigating an irreducibly
unpredictable world. Alice encounters a system which she designates as “Bob”. Alice
can ask Bob about his experiences and use quantum mechanics to predict his answer.
If Alice so chooses, she can incorporate Bob’s responses into her expectations. Nothing
in the formalism of quantum theory forces her to do so, however.
5 Isn’t it just the Copenhagen intepretation?
This has been said a lot through the years, and we continue to hear it today. Some-
times, it’s said that QBism is trying to be more Copenhagen than the Copenhagen
interpretation itself. As if QBism had a fever, and the only prescription were more
Copenhagen! But the idea that there ever was a unified “Copenhagen interpretation”
— i.e., that the definite article is remotely applicable — was a myth of the 1950s.
Trying to exceed “the” Copenhagen interpretation in any respect is to race against a
phantom.
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QBism does not have, for example, Bohr’s emphasis on “ordinary language” [11],
whatever that might mean. Nor does it have the quantum-classical cut of Heisenberg,
the classical laboratory equipment of Landau and Lifshitz [12], the public experimental
records of Pauli [13], the essentially ontic state vectors of early Bohm [14], or the
frequentism of early von Neumann [15]. Unlike van Kampen, QBism does not presume
that the vanishing of interference terms will solve all riddles [16]. Unlike Wheeler,
QBism does not posit that all observers should ideally have the same information
about a system and thus the same quantum state for it [13, footnote 9]. There simply
is not a way to summarize this overflow of differences by claiming that QBism is “more
Copenhagen”.
At one point, the Wikipedia article on QBism claimed that it “is very similar to
the Copenhagen interpretation that is commonly taught in textbooks”. What does this
even mean? First, as we noted, there’s no such thing as “the” Copenhagen interpreta-
tion. In addition, claiming that “the Copenhagen interpretation” is “commonly taught
in textbooks” conflates the early developers of quantum theory and the varied modern
expositions of it into a vague mishmash. Asher Peres’ textbook is more instrumentalist
than the undergraduate standards; the Feynman Lectures handle probability in a less
frequentist way than Peres. Are all common textbooks Copenhagen, or is Copenhagen
that which is commonly taught in all textbooks? Better to strike the term “Copen-
hagen interpretation” from our lexicon going forward and instead be precise about
what views we mean!
6 Why does the interpretation of probability
theory matter?
E. T. Jaynes put the basic point rather well [17]:
[O]ur present QM formalism is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar
mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part incomplete human
information about Nature — all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into
an omelette that nobody has seen how to unscramble. Yet we think that
the unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further advance in basic physical
theory. For, if we cannot separate the subjective and objective aspects of
the formalism, we cannot know what we are talking about; it is just that
simple.
According to Jaynes, the way to unscramble that Heisenberg–Bohr omelette will be
“to find a different formalism, isomorphic in some sense but based on different vari-
ables” [18].
The results of quantum-mechanical calculations are generally probabilities, or stand-
ins for them like rates and effective cross-sections, and so the question “what means
probability?” must be addressed sooner or later. This question gains urgency when we
realize that the inputs to those calculations are just as probabilistic as the outputs. We
can see this concretely by focusing on the simplest possible quantum system, a single
qubit. A quantum state for a qubit can be written as a linear combination of the Pauli
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matrices, where the coefficients are expectation values for the outcomes of the three
Pauli measurements:
ρ = 12 (I + 〈x〉σx + 〈y〉σy + 〈z〉σz) . (1)
Because each Pauli measurement has only two possible outcomes, + and −, we can
write the expectation value 〈x〉 as
〈x〉 = p(+|x)− p(−|x) = 2p(+|x)− 1, (2)
and similarly for 〈y〉 and 〈z〉. Mathematically, any qubit state ρ, whether pure or mixed,
is nothing more than a convenient packaging of the three probabilities p(+|x), p(+|y)
and p(+|z). Thus, whatever status one grants to quantum states, one must grant that
same status to at least some probabilities. Conversely, if a particular interpretation of
probability theory turns out to be logically untenable, then that rules out a possible
way of interpreting quantum states, too.
Note that the fact that specifying a qubit quantum state requires three probability
values is more fundamental than any choice of those values. To put it another way,
when we take our empirically successful theory of physics and find the simplest case
where it applies, we see that the theory has three knobs, not one or two or five. This
is a more primitive, more basal statement about our theory than a choice of ρ is!
Modern quantum information theory provides an even deeper take: Any quantum
state can in fact be specified, not just as a compendium of probabilities for different
experiments, but as a probability distribution over the outcomes of a single experiment.
For more on the concept of a reference measurement, see §10.
7 What is the meaning of the double-slit exper-
iment in QBism?
For a QBist, the double-slit experiment is about the peculiarities that happen when an
agent tries to relate their expectations for one hypothetical scenario to their expecta-
tions for another. Per tradition, we can call this agent Alice. She might compute her
probability for a detector click given that she will place the detector at position x and
open slit #1 — call it P1(x). Likewise, she can compute the corresponding quantities
for the configuration with only slit #2 open, P2(x); and for when both slits are open,
P12(x). All of these quantities are, by themselves, rather ordinary probabilities: None
of them end up being negative, let alone complex. Nor is it surprising that P1(x) might
be discrepant from P2(x) or from P12(x). Different conditions, different probabilities!
The puzzle is that
P12(x) 6= P1(x) + P2(x). (3)
The strangeness lies not in the curve for any particular scenario, but in how the sce-
narios fit together.
Rob Spekkens likes to point out that the mere fact of interference is not a very deep
probe of quantum theory, because interference can arise in models based on local hidden
variables [19, 20]. You just have to be careful and consistent when constructing your
model. In his toy theory, where states are probability distributions over discrete local
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hidden variables, we can build a test for double-slit-type oddities (a toy Mach–Zehnder
interferometer), and indeed, interference occurs.
In order to test quantum theory more stringently, we have to find probes of nonclas-
sical expectation-meshing that resist easy emulation. This, from the QBist perspective,
is what Bell inequality violations are all about: Given any particular choice of detector
settings, the outcome probabilities are just probabilities. The power and the mystery
of quantum theory reside in the relation between probabilities for different choices of
detector settings.
Our research on SICs is also in this vein (see §10). Using a SIC as a reference mea-
surement is like considering a generalized interference experiment, where the outcomes
for the “which-way” measurement correspond to nonorthogonal quantum states. This
generalization takes us out of the realm of easy classical emulation, letting us investi-
gate the quantum formalism more deeply.
8 Doesn’t the PBR theorem prove QBism wrong?
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem demonstrates, as the authors put
it, “that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information about an
underlying physical state of the system, and in which systems that are prepared inde-
pendently have independent physical states, must make predictions which contradict
those of quantum theory” [21]. In the years since its appearance, many have claimed
that the PBR theorem proves quantum states are ontic — that it rules out all epistemic
and doxastic interpretations. One often hears that QBism, having itself a doxastic con-
ception of quantum states, should therefore be ruled out by the lack of any experimental
violations of quantum theory.
But one should not believe these rumors. The PBR theorem does no damage to
QBism. PBR say so themselves at the end of their paper. This is because what
they demonstrate is the inconsistency of the idea of holding epistemic quantum states
at the same time as holding that they are epistemic about ontic states. In QBism,
quantum states represent one’s beliefs, not about some ontic variable, but about one’s
future personal experiences which come in consequence of taking an action on the
external world. I.e., they are epistemic (or better, doxastic) about personal experiences.
Technically, this means there are no compelling reasons in QBism to adopt the very
starting point of PBR — namely, trying to use an integral over ontic states λ to get
probabilities. The PBR theorem is a no-go result for a direction in which we never
wanted to go.
The foundational assumption of the PBR theorem is a rule for computing some
quantities p(k|Ψ(x1, . . . , xn)), probabilities for a measurement outcome k given prepa-
ration of a product state Ψ(x1, . . . , xn). This rule is a statement about conditional
probabilities:
p(k|Ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) =
∫
Λ
· · ·
∫
Λ
p(k|λ1, . . . , λn)µx1(λ1) · · ·µxn(λn)dλ1 · · · dλn . (4)
Here, λi in a measure space Λ is a possible physical state that a system can be in,
µxi(λi) is a probability distribution over Λ for the ith system, and p(k|λ1, . . . , λn) is
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a probability for obtaining outcome k given a set of physical states for each system.
In other words, the whole approach of PBR is trying to identify the Born Rule with
an application of the Law of Total Probability (LTP). It can’t be done, and they have
rediscovered that in their own way.2
The LTP is familiar and what one would use if there were underlying hidden vari-
ables. One avenue of QBist technical research currently ongoing is to explore an al-
ternative to the LTP which expresses the fact that such hidden variables do not exist.
The crucial idea is a reference measurement, a procedure with the property that a
probability distribution over its outcomes can be used to compute the probabilities for
all the outcomes of any other measurement. Let P (Hi) be Alice’s probability for ob-
taining outcome Hi in an optimal reference measurement (many criteria for optimality
turn out to be equivalent for this problem). Classical intuition suggests that the best
possible reference measurement would just be to read off the ontic state, and so by the
LTP,
P (Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) , (5)
for any other measurement {Dj}. But in the quantum world, this does not apply, and
the closest we can get to it, by cannily choosing our reference measurement, is
Q(Dj) =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1)P (Hi)− 1
d
]
P (Dj |Hi) . (6)
Q(Dj) now represents an agent’s probability for obtaining the experience Dj from
a measurement she represents with the POVM {Dj}, P (Hi) is her probability for
obtaining outcome Hi in a hypothetical reference measurement, and P (Dj |Hi) is her
probability, asserted now, for obtaining the experienceDj supposing she had previously
made the reference measurement and obtained experience Hi. Note that the only
difference from the LTP is a constant shift and rescaling of P (Hi) for each i. In fact,
this is the closest [8] the two expressions can come, suggesting that this expression may
provide insight into what it is about the universe that makes it “quantum”.
So, in all, QBists say this about the PBR theorem (and similarly about Bell’s the-
orem): Rather than denigrate the QBist conception of quantum theory, they actually
help compel it. There are so many arguments of analogy for epistemic quantum states
(Rob Spekkens’ toy model nails about 25 of them [19]), but what the PBR and Bell
theorems compel and the toy theories can’t is that, if quantum states are epistemic,
they cannot be epistemic about some ontic variables. The most the PBR theorem can
do is rule out a middle ground that we are not sure anyone actually occupied in the
first place.
2We note that one philosopher of physics has declared, speaking of an assumption equivalent to Eq. (4),
“If you don’t believe that, you don’t believe in physics at all.” As best as we can tell, there is no reason to
accept such a claim, other than an underdeveloped imagination.
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9 Is QBism about the Bayes rule?
Adopting a personalist Bayesian interpretation of probability does not mean treating
all changes of belief as applications of the Bayes rule. This is shocking to some people!
And distancing ourselves from the dogmatists who claim to follow that creed is one
reason why we prefer QBism over “Quantum Bayesianism”.
In the tradition of Ramsey, Savage and de Finetti, there are consistency conditions
that an agent’s probability assignments should meet at any given time, and then there
are guidelines for updating probability assignments in response to new experiences.
Going from the former to the latter requires making extra assumptions — the two are
not as strongly coupled as many people think. The Bayes rule is not a condition on
how an agent must change her probabilities, but rather a condition for how she should
expect that she will modify her beliefs in the light of possible new experiences. For this
observation, we credit Hacking, Jeffrey and van Fraassen.
Fuchs and Schack go into more detail on this point in an article [22], and we wrote
a pedagogical treatment in a book [23, §5.1].
There is a common misconception afoot that being “Bayesian” fundamentally means
using the Bayes rule to update probabilities. For example, the Wikipedia page that
lists things named after Thomas Bayes says that “Bayesian” refers to “concepts and
approaches that are ultimately based on Bayes’ theorem”. This may be historically
correct, but it is not logically correct. In the personalist Bayesian school, we first
start with the idea of quantifying beliefs and expectations as gambling commitments.
Then, we impose a consistency condition, from which the familiar rules of probability
theory follow. The idea of updating probabilities over time in accord with the Bayes
rule arrives rather late in this development. One must first establish the standards
for probabilities being consistent with each other at a particular time, before invoking
further considerations to establish a scheme for changing probabilities in response to
new experiences. Bayes’ theorem is a theorem, not an axiom.
The “collapse of the wavefunction” is analogous to, and an algebraic variant of,
Bayesian conditionalization [24]. Having recognized this, we can appreciate that it
clears up a mystery (or, perhaps better put, allows us to identify a pseudo-mystery
for what it is). But the recognition of the “quantum Bayes rule” was an early step on
the path to QBism, and its relevance in more recent years has if anything been rather
peripheral.
10 What technical questions have been moti-
vated by QBism?
The development of Quantum Bayesianism, and its progressive evolution into QBism,
is a story of feedback loops between technical and philosophical questions.
The quantum de Finetti theorem was sought and proved in order to show there
could be a meaning to the phrase “unknown quantum state” even from a subjectivist
perspective [25]. The Quantum Bayesians thought that without such a theorem, a
subjectivist reading of probability in quantum theory wouldn’t be possible after all.
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This theorem then outgrew its foundational origins, becoming a powerful tool for the
practical problem of analyzing the security of quantum key distribution. A quantum
de Finetti theorem for “unknown processes” followed from the same motivation as that
for “unknown states” [26].
Asher Peres pointed out that quantum states are more analogous to probability
distributions over phase space — that is, to Liouville density functions — than to points
in phase space. In 1995, Fuchs followed this lead and searched for examples within
Liouville mechanics that echoed quantum theory, including the aspects of quantum
theory that had been declared uniquely nonclassical. He found that the quantum no-
cloning theorem was just one such feature: A no-cloning theorem holds in Liouville
mechanics, exactly as in the quantum case. Trying to further refine the enquiry led to
the quantum no-broadcasting theorem [27].
In 2002, Caves, Fuchs and Schack took on the question of whether or not quantum
theory implied any kinds of compatibility conditions for disparate agents’ quantum
state assignments [28]. This is a natural question to ask, if quantum states are to be
interpreted doxastically. The work resulted in solid theorems — and, in a twist whose
irony has gone underappreciated, Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph [21] used one of these
notions to prove the PBR theorem. (For QBism’s response to the PBR theorem, see
§8.)
Another example came from trying to understand what it could mean for quantum
states to be “disturbed by measurement” if they are not ontic. Answering this led
to [29] and [30], which Fuchs later turned to the purpose of defining a threshold for
successful quantum teleportation in Jeff Kimble’s lab [31]. Discussion of this point can
be found in Fuchs and Jacobs [32].
More recently, at the creative interface between conceptual and technical matters,
Fuchs and Schack have made the case that the right way to think about decoherence is
with van Fraassen’s reflection principle [22]. We suspect that there are new theorems
to be proved in this area, in addition to the conceptual implications (such as putting
a sharper point on an old argument of Asher Peres about when black-hole evaporation
should not be modeled with a unitary evolution [33]).
The most active technical topic in contemporary QBism research is the project of
reconstructing quantum theory from physical principles. Central to this is our ongoing
research into symmetric informationally complete quantum measurements (SICs). A
SIC for a d dimensional Hilbert space is a set of d2 pure quantum states with equal
pairwise overlaps:
|〈ψi|ψj〉|2 = dδij + 1
d+ 1 . (7)
A uniform rescaling of these states defines a POVM which is uniquely suited to be a
“standard quantum measurement”.
Not everyone who works on SICs is devoted to QBism. Indeed, we gather from
conversations in hotel bars that one of the prime movers in SIC-hunting doesn’t partic-
ularly care about quantum mechanics; their appeal as geometrical objects is enough.
(Historically speaking, one of the most closely studied SIC constructions originally
flowed from the pen of Coxeter, who just really liked polytopes [34]. But in a surprise
twist, this SIC arises in the study of quantum-state compatibility that Caves, Fuchs
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and Schack initiated [35]!) Another SIC researcher is not a QBist, but came to the
problem through Fuchs’s advocacy and over the years has displayed many sympathies.
Going in the other direction, being a QBist doesn’t mean you have to live and
breathe SICs. Fuchs and BCS put it the following way [3]:
If all that you desire is a story that you can tell about the current quantum
formalism, then all this business about SICs and probabilistic representa-
tions might be of little moment. Of our fellow QBists, we know of one who
likely doesn’t care one way or the other about whether SICs exist. Another
would like to see a general proof come to pass, but is willing to believe that
QBism can just as well be developed without them — i.e., they are not part
of the essential philosophical ideas — and is always quick to make this point.
On the other hand, we two are inclined to believe that QBism will become
stagnant in the way of all other quantum foundations programs without a
deliberate effort to rebuild the formalism.
We find that SICs cut to the heart of quantum theory in a way that other ideas for
rebuilding the formalism do not. This is a point we discuss elsewhere in this collection
(§7), and in earlier papers [3, 36, 37]. The representation of quantum theory that SICs
furnish has natural connections with the study of Wigner-function negativity, which is
important for quantum computation [38]. In addition, the discovery of a connection
between SICs and algebraic number theory reshapes the boundary between physics
and pure mathematics in a remarkable way [39, 40].
11 Isn’t quantum probability just classical prob-
ability but noncommutative?
There’s a Far Side cartoon that shows a man waking up in bed and staring at a giant
note he wrote for himself on the wall: “First pants, then shoes!” The lesson is that
order of operations matters in daily life, long before it matters in quantum physics.
So, we have to be careful what we mean by “noncommuting”, if we want it to have
any meaningful content. And when we do get appropriately mathematical about it, we
find that it is not the signature of the quantum. The Spekkens toy model, which has
a simple statement in terms of underlying local hidden variables, has observables that
do not commute [19].
There is a common sentiment about that quantum mechanics is “a noncommutative
generalization of probability theory”: Instead of using vectors that sum to 1, one has
matrices whose trace is 1, and so forth. This is a fine approach for many applications,
but in physics, there is never a guarantee that a method which works for one set of
problems will do equally well with another. Taking one representation of the theory as
defining its essence can cloud your physical insight. In this case, the “we must generalize
probability to make it noncommutative” impulse obscures the fact that given a specific
experimental scenario, the probabilities of quantum physics are just probabilities —
numbers that play together in accord with Kolmogorov’s rules. As we noted in §7, it
is the meshing of expectations for one scenario with those of another which reveals the
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fundamental enigma of quantum theory. Noncommutativity is a secondary property,
and as the Spekkens toy model teaches us, not a quintessentially quantum one at that.
BCS, who came to QBism from statistical physics, likes to point out that the Doi–
Peliti formalism for nonequilibrium stochastic dynamics has noncommuting operators,
and also complex numbers, Feynman diagrams, renormalization, Glauber states, the
Heisenberg equation of motion, and even the Schwinger representation of su(N). Yet
it is all a fully classical theory [23, 41]. It borrows calculational devices from quantum
mechanics, but the stochasticity it considers is, at root, ignorance about pedestrian
hidden variables.
12 Doesn’t decoherence solve quantum founda-
tions?
The theory of decoherence is a set of calculations which enable one to write a density
matrix that is nearly diagonal in some basis of interest. This does not tell you what a
density matrix means.
Max Schlosshauer, who wrote the canonical textbook on decoherence, recently sum-
marized the situation as follows [42]:
Decoherence, at its heart, is a technical result concerning the dynamics and
measurement statistics of open quantum systems. From this view, decoher-
ence merely addresses a consistency problem, by explaining how and when
the quantum probability distributions approach the classically expected dis-
tributions. Since decoherence follows directly from an application of the
quantum formalism to interacting quantum systems, it is not tied to any
particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, nor does it supply such an
interpretation, nor does it amount to a theory that could make predictions
beyond those of standard quantum mechanics.
The predictively relevant part of decoherence theory relies on reduced
density matrices, whose formalism and interpretation presume the collapse
posultate and Born’s rule. If we understand the “quantum measurement
problem” as the question of how to reconcile the linear, deterministic evolu-
tion described by the Schrödinger equation with the occurrence of random
measurement outcomes, then decoherence has not solved this problem.
For a deeper dive into the QBist take on decoherence, see [22].
13 Is QBism like Rovelli’s “Relational Quantum
Mechanics”?
Several people have made the comparison between QBism and Rovelli’s “Relational
Quantum Mechanics” [43], and it is not unjust. Some slogans of RQM can be carried
over to QBism with only a little modification, and the motivation for the research
program that Rovelli suggested in his original paper has certain affinities with our own.
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However, there are important differences between QBism and RQM, and moreover, we
find the statements of RQM imprecise on key points.
Both QBism and Rovellian RQM reject the notion of a single quantum state for
the entire universe. In QBism, measurement outcomes are personal experiences for the
agent who elicits them, while in RQM, physical properties exist “relationally” between
systems. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, in RQM, “Quantum events
only happen in interactions between systems, and the fact that a quantum event has
happened is only true with respect to the systems involved in the interaction” [44].
This motto is not unlike what we have written about QBism. For example,
Certainly QBism has creation going on all the time and everywhere; quan-
tum measurement is just about an agent hitching a ride and partaking in
that ubiquitous process.
But we can already start to see a divergence. Rovellian RQM downplays the idea
of agency: In RQM, a grain of sand can be an “observer” of another quantum system.
Given any two systems S1 and S2, there is a quantum state of S2 relative to S1, just
as in Newtonian physics, S2 always has a velocity relative to S1.
Likewise, QBism and RQM differ on how to interpret probability. While we find
the foundational papers of RQM somewhat vague on this point, our overall impression
is that RQM leans more to a Jaynesian kind of Bayesianism, more objective and less
personalist than the Ramseyian/de Finettian school to which QBism adheres. This is
tied to a point emphasized in the technical side of QBism (§10). Mathematically speak-
ing, a quantum state is a probability distribution. Pick any informationally complete
POVM, and you can replace density operators with probability distributions over the
outcomes of that POVM (even when the density operators are rank-1 projectors, i.e.,
pure states). As best we can tell from reading Rovelli et al., whenever an “observer”
S1 coexists with another system S2, there exists a unique, physically correct quantum
state for S2 relative to the observer S1. Therefore, there exists a unique, physically
mandated set of probabilities concerning S2, which happen to be relative to S1. We
find this philosophy of probability ultimately untenable [45, 46].
We must also admit, we’re not great fans of the word relational. This adjective
naturally carries the connotation of “just like in relativity theory”. But in relativity,
we can readily transform between reference frames. A statement like “the clocks C1
and C2 are synchronized” is relational: Its truth or falsity depends on whether it is
evaluated by Alice or by Bob. Yet if Alice knows Bob’s trajectory relative to herself,
she can take what she sees and Lorentz-transform her figures to compute what Bob
must see.
In quantum theory, there is no analogue of this. (Emphasizing this point of dis-
analogy is another way QBism distinguishes itself from Bohr [11].) RQM tries to invent
one, but the attempt flounders. We can see exactly how this happens if we examine
Smerlak and Rovelli’s paper “Relational EPR” [47]. The authors take a certain notion
of consistency among multiple observers over from Rovelli’s original paper:
It is one of the most remarkable features of quantum mechanics that indeed
it automatically guarantees precisely the kind of consistency that we see in
nature [Rovelli 1996]. Let us illustrate this assuming that both A and B
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measure the spin in the same direction, say z, that is n = n′ = z.
But on the very next page, they describe the following scenario:
A observes the spin in a given direction to be ↑ and B observes the spin in
the same direction to be also ↑.
And they say that this is an ill-posed statement, because
it does not happen either with respect to A or with respect to B. The two
sequences of events (the one with respect to A and the one with respect to
B) are distinct accounts of the same reality that cannot and should not be
juxtaposed.
But if the second statement is an invalid proposition, then the first must be as well.
The description “both A and B measure the spin in the same direction” cannot apply
“either with respect to A or with respect to B”; it presumes a view from nowhere.
(One could try to evade this by interpreting the story of what both A and B measure
as told relative to a third party, the superobserver C. This might look like it could
ameliorate the problem, at least if the difficulties we saw above could be resolved.
But presuming that a superobserver is always available, and that the expectations of
the superobserver override those of any other participant, just de-relationalizes the
theory all over again. And why should physics guarantee on a fundamental level that
a superobserver is always available? When children or politicians quarrel, life does not
always provide a responsible adult who can restore the peace.) In short, the description
of the gedankenexperiment that Smerlak and Rovelli use to put forth their notion of
“consistency” is exactly the kind of language which they elsewhere insist is meaningless.
One philosophy paper that compared QBism and RQM [48] must be mentioned in
particular.3 We reproduce the relevant passage with its absence of citations preserved
intact:
QBism is the view that quantum mechanics is not a theory about the world,
but about our degrees of credence concerning predictions. The theory pro-
vides universal, objective rules for updating these degrees from the infor-
mation one gets on the world through events. All this is shared by RQM.
One difference is that QBism is human-centered, while RQM is not: any
physical object qualifies as a potential observer. But what remains of it if
all talk of external observers boils down to talk of events relative to us? If
anything, RQM is more radically instrumentalist than QBism: after all, the
latter assumes that events are objective and publicly accessible. . .
Most of this is at least a little wrong, so we will go through it in detail.
QBism is the view that quantum mechanics is not a theory about the world,
but about our degrees of credence concerning predictions.
3We have the sense that, like Bohmian mechanics, RQM has been of interest to philosophers more than
it has been to physicists. The question of what biases the philosophy community perpetuates by always
turning to its familiar authorities for opinions is an interesting one.
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In QBism, quantum mechanics is not a theory directly about the world, but rather, a
theory that any of us can use to manage our “degrees of credence” in light of the fact
that the world has a specific character.
The theory provides universal, objective rules for updating these degrees
from the information one gets on the world through events.
Yes, the rules that quantum theory provides are “universal” (anyone can pick up the
hero’s handbook [3]) and “objective” (or as objective as anyone could want of a physical
theory). The emphasis on “updating” echoes a misconception we have seen elsewhere,
that Bayesian probability is fundamentally about the Bayes update rule (see §9). And
in the QBist understanding of personalist probability, the rules allow more loose play
in updating expectations than this formulation grants.
All this is shared by RQM.
To us, it seems a better fit for RQM than for QBism. As we wrote above, a preference
for objective probability runs through RQM, holding it back.
One difference is that QBism is human-centered, while RQM is not: any
physical object qualifies as a potential observer.
Human-centered, no, but agent-centered, yes. An agent does not have to be human
(see sections §17 and §18).
If anything, RQM is more radically instrumentalist than QBism: after all,
the latter assumes that events are objective and publicly accessible. . .
No, it doesn’t. Fuchs put it this way in 2010 [49]:
Whose information? “Mine!” Information about what? “The consequences
(for me) of my actions upon the physical system!” It’s all “I-I-me-me mine,”
as the Beatles sang.
That article goes on to draw an explicit contrast between QBism and Pauli’s claim
that measurement outcomes “are objectively available for anyone’s inspection”.
The introductory paper by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack [4] expresses the point as
follows:
The personal internal awareness of agents other than Alice of their own
private experience is, by its very nature, inaccessible to Alice, and therefore
not something she can apply quantum mechanics to. But verbal or written
reports to Alice by other agents that attempt to represent their private
experiences are indeed part of Alice’s external world, and therefore suitable
for her applications of quantum mechanics. Having always stressed the
crucial importance of stating the results of experiments in ordinary language,
Bohr would probably have been comfortable with Alice’s indirect access to
Bob’s experience, through language.
But Bohr would not have approved of Alice superposing reports from Bob
about his own experience, as QBism requires her to do if she wants to subject
those reports to analysis before they enter her own experience. We believe
that Bohr would have viewed Bob’s reports — formulations in ordinary
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language — as beyond the scope of quantum mechanics. But because Alice
can treat Bob as an external physical system, according to QBism she can
assign him a quantum state that encodes her probabilities for the possible
answers to any question she puts to him. When Alice elicits an answer from
Bob, she treats this as she treats any other quantum measurement. Bob’s
answer is created for Alice only when it enters her experience. A QBist
does not treat Alice’s interaction with Bob any differently from, say, her
interaction with a Stern–Gerlach apparatus, or with an atom entering that
apparatus.
Or, later and more compactly:
What the usual story [of Wigner’s Friend] overlooks is that the coming into
existence of a particular measurement outcome is valid only for the agent
experiencing that outcome.
14 Why do QBists prefer de Finetti over Cox?
The Cox approach is too psychologically loaded in the direction of hidden variables
and inferences about them. This sentiment dates back to the 1990s, when Fuchs and
colleagues were hashing out the basics of being Bayesian in a quantum world. During
1993 and 1994, Fuchs and Schack became disenchanted with Cox’s development of
probability theory and attracted instead more to the development of de Finetti and
Savage and others. The essence of the latter school is the Dutch-book notion and/or the
simultaneous development of probabilities with utilities (i.e., decision theory). Looking
back on it, the attraction to the one over the other cuts to a rather fundamental point:
QBism regards physics, and science in general, in Darwinian terms. The mathemat-
ics we develop is practical because, at root, it helps agents to survive. From this point
of view, the idea of a probability as a gambling commitment, a belief made quantitative
and ready to be acted upon, is an attractive notion. On the other hand, the idea of
probability being used for a “theory of inference” in the usual sense — i.e., a measure
of plausibility for something that is “out there” but unknown — is a bit off-putting.
(This also seems to be a fundamental distinction between our program and that of
Rob Spekkens. The general tenor of the Spekkensian program has been to interpret
quantum states as states of information about some type of hidden variable as yet
unspecified, perhaps degrees of freedom that are “relational” in some way. The Coxian
attitude is a natural fit for this view, but it is not so for QBism.)
All the way back in July 1996, Fuchs wrote the following, in a note to Sam Braun-
stein:
While in Torino, you really got me interested in the old [Cox derivation]
question again. I noticed in this version of the book that Jaynes makes
some points about how there are still quite a few questions about how to set
priors when you don’t even know how many outcomes there are to a given
experiment, i.e., you don’t even know the cardinality of your sample space.
That, it seems to me, has something of the flavor of quantum mechanics . . .
where you have an extra freedom not even imagined in classical probability.
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The states of knowledge are now quantum states instead of probability dis-
tributions; and one reason for this is that the sample space is not fixed —
any POVM corresponds to a valid question of the system. The number of
outcomes of the experiment can be as small as two or, instead, as large as
you want.
However I don’t think there’s anything interesting to be gained from
simply trying to redo the Coxian “plausibility” argument but with complex
numbers. It seems to me that it’ll more necessarily be something along
the lines of: “When you ask me, “Where do all the quantum mechanical
outcomes come from?” I must reply, “There is no where there.” [. . . ] That is
to say, my favorite “happy” thought is that when we know how to properly
take into account the piece of prior information that “there is no where
there” concerning the origin of quantum mechanical measurement outcomes,
then we will be left with “plausibility spaces” that are so restricted as to
be isomorphic to Hilbert spaces. But that’s just thinking my fantasies out
loud.
More recently, we have made steps in this direction, as documented in our earlier
papers [3, 36, 50] and outlined in §10.
15 Why so much emphasis on finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces?
Quantum theory can be formulated for finite- and infinite-dimensional systems. By
any standard, genuinely nonclassical effects are present in finite-dimensional systems,
suggesting that these may be all that is strictly necessary for capturing the conceptual
core of the theory. Indeed, it might even be distracting to let infinite dimensions
complicate foundational considerations. In some ways the infinite-dimensional situation
is the limit of large dimensions, but in other ways it isn’t.
Infinite dimensions are subtle and complicated, but it seems they are not so for
“quantum” reasons.
The goal of our research is to bring clarity to the quantum mysteries. When one
looks up what the “quantum mysteries” are, one finds that either they are expressed in
finite-dimensional terms from the get-go [51], or, if the presentation includes continuous
degrees of freedom, all the interesting stuff happens in the finite-dimensional part. For
example, Asher Peres’ book explains a Bell–EPR scenario using both position and spin
degrees of freedom, but the essence of the problem lies in the spins, while the position
coordinates just provide conceptual scaffolding. To “go for the jugular” of the quantum
enigmas, we have chosen to focus on finite dimensions — and the results have been so
pretty that we can’t help but wonder if they offer a guide for where physics should go
next, as it pushes beyond the continuum theories we all know so well.
The authors of this FAQ spend our weekdays reformulating finite-dimensional quan-
tum theory (see §10). However, we would have nothing personal against anyone who
tried to find a new representation for, say, algebraic quantum field theory. We do offer
a cautionary note: Even the most successful and most “fundamental” physical theories
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are provisional, their applicability contingent on physicists’ limited abilities as agents
to intervene into the affairs of other natural systems. Indeed, the way we extract any
empirical utility from a QFT is, in practice, to remind ourselves that it cannot be valid
to arbitrarily high energies, and then managing the consequences of that limitation (a
process technically known as regularization and renormalization). When one cannot
trust any physical theory to provide ultimate, metaphysical bedrock; when all the
theories one might wish to reformulate and reconstruct are inextricably provisional —
then, unavoidably, picking the theory to focus upon becomes a judgment call.
It is intriguing that the possibility that physically accessible Hilbert-space dimen-
sion is always finite — possibly quite large, but still finite — is a recurring theme in
quantum-gravity research. For various flavors of this idea, see, e.g., [52, 53, 54, 55].
Fuchs and BCS gave a QBist spin on this speculation in 2016 [3], following a lead that
Fuchs set out in 2010 [56] and 2004 [57].4
16 Aren’t the probabilities in quantum physics
objective?
The intuition that the probabilities in quantum physics are objective properties of a
system is deeply ingrained. For many, the suggestion that it might be otherwise is
so outlandish as to obviate the need for rebuttal. Thus the starting point of QBism,
adopting a strict, de Finettian/Ramseyan interpretation of all probabilities, turns out
to be a big pill to swallow once the full seriousness of its consequences are realized.
However, QBists do not deny the objective probability intution. What we claim is
that the advantages that subjectivity brings (which may be found in any exposition of
QBism) outweigh the draw of untutored impulses. In fact, the appeal of this intuition
may be understood from and thereby absorbed into a purely personalist point of view.
There is nothing about the intuition which demands the invocation of quantum
theory. For instance, we might just as well consider a coin or a die. One often hears that
the symmetries of the matter distribution making up a “fair” coin or a die determine
the probability of a flip landing “heads” or of rolling a “3”. But what does it mean for
a coin to be “fair”? It means that one assigns equal probability to the heads and tails
outcomes. How does one certify that a coin is fair? If the answer involves checking that
the coin’s mass distribution closely matches that of a thin cylinder, claiming that the
probability distribution comes from the mass distribution is circular. We bring many
expectations and a lifetime of experience to the table when asserting a probability.
Among these is experience with the effects of gravity on differently shaped objects.
The reason that it feels our probabilities are properties of objects is just that we feel
the force of our priors so strongly that we feel they were given to us by nature.
More generally, if we wanted the probability to be physically determined, a little
reflection reveals it couldn’t be a property only of the coin itself. It must also depend
on the flipping process. A coin can have a very even mass distribution while it sits
forgotten on the bedside table. For that matter, it is quite possible to engineer a
4And, in correspondence with Bill Unruh and others, even before that [58, pp. 659–52].
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machine which precisely flips a coin to land heads up every time [59]. Furthermore,
couldn’t a high-speed camera and a sufficiently advanced computer program predict the
result of any particular coin toss with amazingly few errors given the first few fractions
of a second of the flip? With such a setup, what should we say is the probability of
heads after the machine announces its prediction?
Supposing the force of these arguments is felt and the conclusion that probability
is about personal expectations is accepted, there remains one refuge for the objec-
tive probabilists — essentially, that quantum theory legitimizes them. Classically, one
might argue, complete information is in principle possible, but quantum mechanically,
maximal information is incomplete. What’s left over is the objective chance. If one
knew the objective chance, they would be best served by setting their personal expec-
tation equal to it.
First, we note that maximal information being incomplete doesn’t require the na-
ture of probability to change. Supposing there is a correct probability in a given
circumstance remains a big leap. But there is a more critical issue, namely, if there
were a correct probability, there’s no way to be sure you’ve got it. Here’s how Fuchs
and BCS put it in a previous paper [3].
Previous to Bayesianism, probability was often thought to be a physical
property—something objective and having nothing to do with decision-
making or agents at all. But when thought so, it could be thought only
inconsistently so. And hell hath no fury like an inconsistency scorned. The
trouble is always the same in all its varied and complicated forms: If proba-
bility is to be a physical property, it had better be a rather ghostly one—one
that can be told of in campfire stories, but never quite prodded out of the
shadows. Here’s a sample dialogue:
Pre-Bayesian: Ridiculous, probabilities are without doubt ob-
jective. They can be seen in the relative frequencies they cause.
Bayesian: So if p = 0.75 for some event, after 1000 trials we’ll see
exactly 750 such events?
Pre-Bayesian: You might, but most likely you won’t see that
exactly. You’re just likely to see something close to it.
Bayesian: “Likely”? “Close”? How do you define or quantify
these things without making reference to your degrees of belief
for what will happen?
Pre-Bayesian: Well, in any case, in the infinite limit the correct
frequency will definitely occur.
Bayesian: How would I know? Are you saying that in one billion
trials I could not possibly see an “incorrect” frequency? In one
trillion?
Pre-Bayesian: OK, you can in principle see an incorrect fre-
quency, but it’d be ever less likely!
Bayesian: Tell me once again, what does “likely” mean?
This is a cartoon of course, but it captures the essence and the futility of
every such debate. It is better to admit at the outset that probability is a
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degree of belief, and deal with the world on its own terms as it coughs up
its objects and events. What do we gain for our theoretical conceptions by
saying that along with each actual event there is a ghostly spirit (its “ob-
jective probability,” its “propensity,” its “objective chance”) gently nudging
it to happen just as it did? Objects and events are enough by themselves.
To see how quantum physics does not make probabilities somehow more objective,
consider the following [50]. Take a two-qubit system for which an agents could make
either of the two quantum state assignments ρ+ and ρ−, defined by
ρ± =
1
2
(
|0〉〈0|⊗2 + |±〉〈±|⊗2
)
(8)
where we have used the common notation
|±〉 =
√
1
2(|0〉 ± |1〉) . (9)
These state assignments are “compatible” in that they have overlapping supports on the
two-qubit state space. Yet suppose the first qubit is measured in the “computational
basis” {|0〉, |1〉} and outcome 1 is found. The agent updates her state accordingly, using
the standard Lüders rule, and her postmeasurement state for the second qubit is then
|+〉. However, if she had begun with the joint state ρ−, then experiencing outcome
1 would have led her to update her state for the second qubit to |−〉 instead. The
two possibilities for the initial state were compatible, but the two possible final states,
updated in response to exactly the same data, are orthogonal! This is an illustrative
extreme case of a phenomenon that is much more general: Priors do not inevitably
wash out, even in the limit of infinite data [60].
17 Don’t you have to define “agent”?
Fuchs and BCS wrote the following in an earlier paper:
Thinking of probability theory in the personalist Bayesian way, as an exten-
sion of formal logic, would one ever imagine that the notion of an agent, the
user of the theory, could be derived out of its conceptual apparatus? Clearly
not. How could you possibly get flesh and bones out of a calculus for making
wise decisions? [. . . ] Look as one might in a probability textbook for the
ingredients to reconstruct the reader herself, one will never find them. So
too, the QBist says of quantum theory.
This perspective is essentially that of L. J. Savage, who developed rational decision
theory in terms of “consequences”, “acts” and “decisions” [61], though where Savage
says “person” we say agent instead.
An analogy may be helpful. In the Peano axioms for arithmetic [62], the terms
number, zero and successor are undefined primitives. They gain meaning by how they
play together. Seeking a more elementary meaning of those terms within the same
theory is not helpful. Instead of trying an analysis — in the literal sense, a “breaking
down” — one develops an understanding by synthesis, by a bringing-together. The
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same can be said of Hilbert’s axiomitazation of geometry, in which point and line are
undefined primitives [63].
The situation in personalist Bayesian probability is somewhat similar. There is no
way of carving up the terms gambler or expectation into smaller conceptual atoms, at
least not within probability theory itself. Personalist Bayesianism is a synthetic theory
of quantified expectations, and there is nothing troublesome about this. QBism simply
inherits this situation, applying that synthetic understanding to quantum phenomena.
Just like point and line, or zero and number and successor, the terms agent and
experience gain meaning through their interplay. Using them in physics brings some
baggage from their use in everyday speech, though their meaning is altered — refined,
honed — by deployment in the more quantified setting. This is nothing remarkable:
Think of force, potential, field and so forth.
18 Where and when does the agent end and the
external world begin?
At a conference in 2016, Wayne Myrvold asked this:
Okay, help me understand this restriction of [the] scope of quantum mechan-
ics you’re proposing, because you’re telling me I should only use quantum
mechanics to calculate probabilities for outcomes of my future experiences,
and that, compared to what most people think is the scope of the theory,
is a really serious restriction of scope. So imagine that yesterday someone
came to me and said, “Wayne I want your advice on how to construct a
nuclear waste storage facility.” To do this I need to know about calculating
probabilities of decays. So should I not care about any decays that might
happen after I’m gone? Would it be a mistake to use quantum mechanics
to calculate probabilities of radioactive decays hundreds of years after I’m
dead?
The quantum formalism, understood as a normative criterion for an agent’s be-
havior, is rather agnostic about the character of the agent. It says nothing about the
agent’s memory capacity, their rate of energy consumption, how long they maintain
conscious thought at a stretch, or how quickly the molecules of their body are replaced
by food. Looking for this kind of information in the quantum formalism confuses the
roles of agent and object. If one is dully reductionist and tries to specify the prop-
erties of an agent in more and more physical detail, one will eventually be writing a
many-body wavefunction. But any wavefunction is only meaningful as a mental tool
an agent carries to manage their expectations about something else.
Likewise, the quantum formalism itself does not tell Alice how to attach POVM
elements to her experiences. Instead, it is a handbook that she can use to help herself
be consistent, howsoever she sets about mathematizing her life. The formalism does
not care whether she believes that she will die tomorrow, whether she thinks she
can cryogenically freeze herself and wake up on Mars a thousand years from now still
essentially Alice, whether she regards potential genetic descendants of herself as sharing
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in her good or ill fortune — nothing of the sort. Instead, the formalism helps her gamble
consistently, using whatever beliefs she currently has about such matters.
In the case of a gamble with consequences beyond an individual’s expectations for
their own longevity, the “agent” making the bet may be a community, rather than
a single human being. Perhaps it is a collaboration of a number of scientists which
grows or shrinks as years go by. The situation is similar to that of an individual buying
life insurance. Why would anyone ever do this? Life insurance pays out only if the
individual making the purchase dies — it’s impossible for anyone to reap the benefits
of their own life insurance policy. The answer is quite intuitive: Because they consider
their family to be an extension of themselves. Even though they, personally, will be
gone, a conceptual part of themselves remains which can cash the check. It is like the
couple who shares a bank account and makes purchasing decisions on the basis of “us”
rather than either of them alone. The concept of an agent is extremely flexible.
Quantum theory tells us that an agent can express her expectations in terms of
probabilities for a hypothetical “Bureau of Standards” experiment (see §8 and §10).
The BoS experiment might be exceedingly difficult to carry out: Perhaps it costs
a hundred million dollars in optical equipment. But, even though Alice does not
physically perform it, it is mentally useful for her in her cogitations.
What about an experiment that requires a forbiddingly large investment of another
resource — not money, but time? The same binding of expectations between different
hypothetical scenarios should still apply. Mathematically, all the prolongation implies
is an orthogonal transformation of her probability vector.
To push it a step further: What if Alice contemplates the hypothetical experiment
of extending her own life radically? She sees no ready path to doing so, but she lets her
imagination wander. Could she replace her neurons one by one with nanomachines?
Does her overall mesh of beliefs about her own agenthood permit the idea that any
meaningful aspect of her could persist? Even if Alice finds the whole notion exceedingly
implausible, can she treat it simply as another experiment that would require a large
resource investment to realize?
The QBist answer is “Yes” — or, more carefully, that nothing in the quantum
formalism itself forbids it.
We are reminded of a lesson from a colleague.
This is a good example of the primary point of Dirac notation: it has many
built in ambiguities, but it is designed so that any way you chose to re-
solve those ambiguities is correct. In this way elementary little theorems
become consequences of the notation. Mathematicians tend to loathe Dirac
notation, because it prevents them from making distinctions they consider
important. Physicists love Dirac notation, because they are always forget-
ting that such distinctions exist and the notation liberates them from having
to remember.
— N. David Mermin, “Lecture Notes on Quantum Computation” (2003)
The philosophy of personal identity is brimming with ambiguities, but living in
accord with the normative principles of the quantum formalism means that any way I
choose to resolve them is correct.
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19 Does QBism lose the “explanatory power”
of other interpretations?
In the philosophy of science, explanations can be causal, unificationist, deductive-
nomological, statistical relevantist, inducto-statistical, asymptotic and probably other
types besides [64]. Sometimes, epochal progress is made by declaring that an en-
tire genre of attempted explanations is unnecessary, misguided and counterproductive.
We’ve been doing that ever since some clever ancient Greek decided that they could con-
template thunder without drawing the family tree of the Thunderer. While Descartes
pictured the planets as being dragged about in a material whirlpool, Newton declared,
“I feign no hypotheses” and gave us classical mechanics. The manifold complexities of
living beings did not require central planning — only, as Darwin taught us, heredity
and luck. Einstein postulated the constancy of the speed of light, without worrying
about how moving through the ether might elastically deform the electron, and that is
why we learn Lorentz’s equations but with Einstein’s motivation.
In a sense, Newton explained less than Kepler did, because Kepler had a reason
why there were six and only six planets: After six planets, we run out of Platonic
solids. We can rightly reject Kepler’s explanation, even in the absence of a complete
story about how the solar system happened — and even though Newton’s explanation
was, by the standards of his time, frankly un-“physical”.5 Quantum physics leads us
to go further than Newton. Instead of merely saying “I feign no hypothesis”, we can
declare that the character of the natural world is such that “feigning a hypothesis” —
erasing agency and telling a story from a God’s-eye perspective — is a bad idea. This is
an affirmative statement about ontology, and the furthest thing possible from asserting
that the world vanishes when I close my eyes (see §4).
To ask quantum theory for a story about what happens at the slits of a double-
slit experiment “when nobody is looking” is like taking thermodynamics and saying,
“OK, but where is the phlogiston?”, or seeing the inverse-square law of gravity and
demanding to be shown the dodecahedron that makes it go.
One motivation for the technical side of QBism (see §10), particularly the project
of reconstructing quantum theory from physical principles, is to elevate the quality of
explanations of which quantum physics is capable. The quantum formalism can be
applied to any physical system, minuscule or vast, and so any lesson gleaned from the
formalism itself must be a very general one — a why that pertains, in some measure,
anywhere. We physicists tend to like explanations that cut to the fundamental prin-
ciples of a subject, particularly with a dramatic twist that makes the argument more
obvious in retrospect. The opaque nature of the textbook quantum formalism doesn’t
just make teaching the subject difficult. (“Master these fifty pages of differential equa-
tions and operator theory. Just trust us. Yours not to question why.”) It also buries
5Kepler’s image of nested spheres and regular solids seems absurdly numerological today, though anyone
who has wanted E8 or the Monster group to appear in fundamental physics, just for the æsthetics of it, should
feel the tug of the Platonic solids! (We strongly doubt that there is any “theory of everything” inside E8 [65],
although the corresponding lattice does turn out to involve a peculiarly nice quantum measurement [66, 67].)
Kepler’s geometrical model was wrong, but it was specific, quantitative, directly inspirational and, unlike
many bits of our scientific heritage [68, 69], not breathtakingly racist, which maybe counts for something.
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the enigmatic features of the theory, like the violation of Bell inequalities, and limits
physicists’ abilities to devise good explanations. We aim to fix this — but that is a
whole project (§10).
When critics have challenged us on the issue of QBism’s “explanatory power”, the
type of explanation they’ve often had in mind is something like what solid-state physics
has to say about matter being solid. Pauli exclusion keeps you from falling through
the floor; checkmate, QBists! And in fairness, this does sound rather removed from
the scenarios that the QBist literature has mostly dwelled upon — an example of
QBism showing its ancestry in quantum information science. Where are agents and
interventions in the topics preferred in solid-state society?
In physics, an explanation is not a statement made in isolation. We do not just say,
“That rock will sit there without collapsing in on itself.” We naturally go a step further:
“That rock will resist being squeezed.” Squeezing a rock in one’s hands is a quantum
measurement — merely a very imprecise one, for which the textbooks don’t say much
about representing by a POVM. When we invest meaning in words like solid and rigid
and incompressible, we are, at least tacitly, making claims about how a physical system
will react against interventions. And thus, even in solid-state mechanics, agenthood
was there all along. The fact that we do not make single predictions in isolation is
ultimately baked into the formalism, because asserting a quantum state assignment ρ
for a system implies quantitative expectations about the outcomes of any experiment
that one can represent in the theory. No expectation value stands alone.6
20 Aren’t probabilities an insufficient represen-
tation of beliefs?
We don’t claim that personalist Bayesian probability theory is the end of the story.
We only hold that it is adequate where it is needed: It is a tool applicable when
experiments can be defined quantitatively and the sample spaces of their potential
outcomes tabulated in advance. BCS notes, “This is one reason why I say expectation
instead of belief sometimes. It carries a bit of a connotation of belief quantified and
rigorized, rather than left raw. Plus, the X makes it sound cool.”
A great amount of confusion has been stirred up by the misconception that per-
sonalist Bayesianism presumes that living human beings actually do act as perfectly
rational expectation-balancing agents. In this regard, we share a wry observation of
Diaconis and Skyrms [59]:
In a large and growing experimental literature in psychology and behavioral
economics, it appears that almost all theories are systematically violated by
some significant proportion of the population. It also appears that there are
6When our measurements are sloppy, we can typically get by without the full apparatus of quantum theory
to guide our actions. We can use dodges like average densities of energy levels. We can cheat and model
a phenomenon as a classical stochastic process with mundane parameters like average reaction rates. The
more closely we interrogate the world, the more we need quantum theory in order to prosper in it. Freedom
to intervene, and precision of intervention, are resources. When an agent is limited in these regards, the full
vitality of quantum phenomena is denied them.
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different types in the population. Some violate one principle; some violate
another. And there are even some expected utility maximizers.
In other words, the theory of personalist Bayesian probability is normative, not de-
scriptive.
21 What does unitary time evolution mean in
QBism?
This is a point that we addressed a bit tersely in earlier publications [3, 15, 24, 50], and
which we approached from multiple directions amid a large samizdat of miscellany [58].
In this section, we will attempt a balance between these two levels of verbosity.
Fuchs pointed out some time ago that the arguments for the subjectivity of quantum
states also apply to unitary time evolutions [24]. Unitaries can be toggled from a
distance; they can be teleported. More recent work on the probabilistic representation
of quantum theory makes the point even more directly: Quantum states are probability
distributions (§8), and unitaries are conditional probabilities, used in a way that respects
the nonexistence of hidden variables.
Consider an agent Alice, who uses quantum theory to help herself navigate the
world. Accordingly, she carries a probability distribution for an informationally com-
plete measurement, which she uses to summarize her expectations. Alice can calculate
other probability distributions from it, including distributions for other informationally
complete measurements which she might carry out in the distant future. The textbook
way of writing a unitary evolution is to say
ρ′ = U(t)ρU(t)†, (10)
where the operator U(t) models the passage of an amount of time t. Both density op-
erators ρ and ρ′ express beliefs that Alice holds now. The former encodes her present
beliefs about a reference measurement she might perform immediately, while the lat-
ter encodes her beliefs about what she might experience were she to instead perform
that reference measurement at a later time. All of these beliefs, which she expresses
quantitatively as gambling commitments, are commitments she makes at the present
time. If time 0 is Monday at noon, and time t is noon on Tuesday, then ρ is Alice’s
gambling commitment about a measurement she might perform on Monday, and ρ′
is the commitment she holds simultaneously about a measurement to potentially be
done on Tuesday. The unitary operator U(t) is, likewise, a belief that she holds as
part of the same mesh of expectations that includes ρ and ρ′. It is, in this sense, a
statement synchronic with ρ and ρ′. It does not express how Alice’s beliefs must nec-
essarily change as time passes, though if Tuesday rolls around and Alice has not yet
performed a measurement, she can adopt her old numbers ρ′ as her new expectations
for a reference measurement.
For simplicity, let’s assume that the system Alice is contemplating experiments
upon is one for which she knows a SIC. She represents her quantum state ρ using the
Born Rule as
P (Hi) =
1
d
tr(ρΠi) , (11)
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where the projectors {Πi} satisfy
tr(ΠiΠj) =
dδij + 1
d+ 1 . (12)
Then, she can write the Born Rule for any other POVM {Dj} as a simple modification
of the Law of Total Probability:
Q(Dj) =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1)P (Hi)− 1
d
]
P (Dj |Hi) . (13)
If Alice uses something other than a SIC as her reference measurement {Hi}, the
formula will be more complicated, but the concepts are the same. A unitary transfor-
mation of ρ can be shifted onto the elements of the reference measurement, since
P ′(Hj |t) = tr(ρ′Hj) = tr[U(t)ρU †(t)Hj ] = tr[ρ(U †(t)HjU(t))] . (14)
Expressing ρ in terms of P (Hi), this becomes
P ′(Hj |t) =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1)P (Hi)− 1
d
]
R(Hj |Hi, t) , (15)
where
R(Hj |Hi, t) = 1
d
tr(U(t)ΠiU †Πj) (16)
is a matrix of conditional probabilities. The value of R(Hj |Hi, t) is Alice’s probability
for obtaining the jth outcome of a reference measurement when her state assignment is
the projector Πi, unitarily rotated by U(t). Note that classically, we would express the
relation between Alice’s current probabilities for a measurement now and her current
probabilities for a measurement later as
P ′(Hj |t) =
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)R(Hj |Hi, t) . (17)
In quantummechanics, we cannot think of time evolution as shifts in the values taken by
hidden variables, so we do not use this expression, but rather its quantum replacement,
which simplifies to
P ′(Hj |t) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)R(Hj |Hi, t)− 1
d
. (18)
All of the quantities P (Hi), P ′(Hj |t) and R(Hj |Hi, t) are beliefs that Alice holds si-
multaneously. They all have the same status, in that they are personalist Bayesian
probabilities, every one of them.
Over the years, we have noticed that some people who are on board with quantum
states being subjective still balk at the prospect of regarding quantum operations that
way. Imbuing unitaries with subjectivity, they fear, risks the whole Standard Model
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going up in a puff of arthouse smoke. This concern is understandable, but misplaced.
We find that a personalist Bayesian take on unitaries, and the “all QFTs are effective
QFTs” ethos of weekday field theory [70], meet quite nicely if we only let them. What
follows is speculation for the future development of physics, guided by the lessons of
practical applications.
Let’s suppose that Alice is a physicist who is preparing to do an experiment, say on
a spin system. Following ordinary procedure, she writes down a unitary time-evolution
operator generated by a Hamiltonian. What does this Hamiltonian encode? Well,
it expresses what Alice is doing with her laboratory equipment: the ~E and ~B fields
established by charged capacitor plates and current-carrying wires, for example. An
old book might have called this information “a complete description of the apparatus
in everyday language, suitably augmented with the concepts of classical physics”. But
Alice knows that she can treat any item of her laboratory apparatus as a quantum sys-
tem in its own right. For instance, she can use the quantum theory of solids to explain
why she can force a current through her coiled wire. So, that which she expresses as
a unitary operator, she also recognizes from a broader perspective as a mathematical
consequence, in principle, of a quantum state assignment. The “effective unitary” she
implements naturally has, therefore, the same physical status as her quantum-state
ascriptions: They are all, at root, personalist Bayesian expectations.
What, then, of the most “fundamental” time evolutions of all? Let us go all the way,
or at least as far as modern physics can take us. What is the status of the Standard
Model Lagrangian in QBism? Apart from the last two words, this is a question already
generations old; the project of grand unification, seen as quite respectable, has with
game persistence tried to understand the Standard Model as the low-energy limit of a
new theory, not too dissimilar to it in basic conceptions.
We do not want to prejudge the matter and ennoble some part of a theory too
rashly. After all, human mathematicians have yet to express a nontrivial QFT in a
way that meets even their own standards of rigor, let alone a way that would be suitable
for the “eyes of God”. Among the manifold interesting complications is the fact that
not all QFTs are written in terms of a Lagrangian, and it is conceivable that not all of
them can be [71].
In order to wring practical numbers out of a QFT, one admits that the theory only
applies up to some high-energy or short-distance cutoff, and then one deals with this
limitation in an emotionally mature manner. This discipline is known as regularization
and renormalization [72]. A scattering amplitude is computed as a function, not just of
particle momenta and coupling strengths, but also of the ultraviolet cutoff. Changes in
some of these parameters can be absorbed by changes in others, leaving the scattering
amplitude numerically unchanged. The theory is not just a single choice of terms and
coefficients, but the entire renormalization-group flow.
Seen in this light, the core of a QFT begins to take on a role akin to the Born
Rule: a normative constraint relating expectations for different experiments. The story
of integrating over UV degrees of freedom, beta functions, the running of coupling
“constants” — it brings the message that gambles at one energy ought to be tied with
gambles at another.7
7A related hint comes from lattice gauge theory, where the gauge group is specified at a quite primitive
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It is conceivable that when the foundational unscrambling (§6) is complete, unitary
operators will join quantum states on the doxastic side of the line, while the funda-
mental core of a “grand unified” theory will, like the Born Rule, reveal itself as an
empirically motivated, normative addition to probability theory.
22 What do the recent ExtendedWigner’s Friend
thought-experiments imply for QBism?
The past few years have seen the birth of a mini-field, where the thought-experiment
called Wigner’s Friend is wrapped around a no-hidden-variables argument [5, 6, 75, 76].
We’ve read the papers, we’ve been to a workshop [77], and we’re still not convinced
that the introduction of additional friends, robots or Wigners goes beyond the original
Wigner’s Friend “paradox” that QBism already answered on its own terms [3]. In
order to deserve attention, a “paradox” should reveal an actual inconsistency following
from the premises of some interpretation. From our perspective, every new variant just
does other things that we know are fallacious: treating unitaries as ontic, acting like
systems have quantum states when there is no agent to assign them, pretending that
probabilities follow from frequencies, making believe that decision theory is meaningful
when agents are so constrained they can make no choices, etc. The extra complexity
introduces additional opportunities for confusion, without making the argument more
forceful. We would like this situation to change; for example, it would be interesting
to derive a new quantitative criterion of classicality from these considerations. But
the mini-field that studies Wigner’s friends, cousins and former roommates is not quite
there yet. So far, the conditions deduced from these thought experiments have been
Bell-type inequalities given slightly rephrased justifications, and thus they have not
pointed to fundamentally novel issues.
23 Is QBism compatible with the Many Worlds
Interpretation?
Sometimes, when ideas are presented as going off in two opposite directions, the reason
is that they really are, and there isn’t any secret centrist wisdom in trying to yoke them
back together.
There is no one single Everettian faith, any more than there is truly a unified
“Copenhagen Interpretation” (see §5). Instead, the genus has many species, frequently
incompatible with one another [78]. On rare occasions, an apostle of one of these creeds
might make a statement that, in isolation, has a vague affinity to a QBist position.
That much is to be expected, since we are all talking about quantum physics, and we
are not trying to hang a bag of hidden variables on the side of it (as, say, the Bohmians
level of setting up the problem [73, §VII.1], much like the selection of Hilbert-space dimensionality in quantum
computation, and what follows is rather like a complexified MaxEnt [74].
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are wont to do). But we QBists have no physical state vector for the entire universe,
no All-Function evolving unitarily in the eye of God.
Imagine, if you can, a physical state vector for the entire cosmos |Ψ〉, and a fac-
torization of the cosmic Hilbert space into distinguished subsystems. (An Everettian
creed will either presume this or attempt to derive it, generally by way of an argument
that turns out to be circular.) Now, pick one of those subsystems and take the trace of
|Ψ〉 over all the others. The marginal state of the focal subsystem is then the unique,
physically mandated density operator for that subsystem, fixed by ontology. But in
QBism, there is no such thing.
The same holds true if one tries to decompose the All-Function into “relative states”
of observers and observed. When the carving is all done, the pieces are each physically
mandated, ontologically fixed — and that’s simply not the role that any quantum state
plays in QBism.
A typical move for modern Everettians is to take the quantum-mechanical formal-
ism, chop off the Born rule and then claim to re-derive it. Generally, the algebra can
be made to cough up a set of numerical weights, but the identification of those weights
as probabilities in any meaningful sense turns out rather unwarranted.
Take another look at the infrastructure underlying the Everettian story: complex
Hilbert space, time evolution as unitary operator, etc. To us, all of those cry out for
explanation. Indeed, the Born Rule, the very part of the theory that Everettians wish
to excise — the part to be re-derived as a technicality, delegated to the afterthoughts
— may be the most important part of all. Properly formulated, it might well bring
the essential enigma of the quantum into the spotlight with a clarity never before
achieved [36].
By contrast, we see nothing in the Everettian picture that is uniquely compelled
by quantum theory specifically. For instance, you could invent a Many-Worlds Inter-
pretation of Spekkens’ toy model (as John Smolin once admitted [58, p. 1407]). The
result would be baroque and contrived, revealing nothing about the model itself.
We suspect that the appeal of multiverse imagery has more to do with psychology
than with physics. Quoting a letter Fuchs wrote in 2002 [58, p. 347]:
What I find egocentric about the Everett point of view is the way it purports
to be a means for us little finite beings to get outside the universe and imag-
ine what it is doing as a whole. And what is it doing as a whole? Something
fantastic? Something almost undreamable?! Something inexpressible in the
words of man?!?! Nope. It’s conforming to a scheme some guy dreamed up
in the 1950s.
This whole fantastic universe can be boiled down to something repre-
sentable within one of its most insignificant components — the brain of
man. Even toying with that idea, strikes me as an egocentrism beyond be-
lief. The universe makes use of no principle that cannot already be stuffed
into the head of an average PhD in physics? The chain of logic that leads
to the truth of the four-color theorem (apparently) can’t be stuffed into our
heads, but the ultimate operating principle for all that “is” and “can be”
can?
Other varieties of multiversitarianism also leave us unmoved. To adapt a line
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of Martin Gardner, observable universes are not even as common as two blackber-
ries. Proclamations about “the multiverse” appear to us like failures of imagination,
wrapped up in extravagances that provide a certain unsubtle, bulk-rate imitation of
it. Our cynical view of these proclamations may be due to our preference for the
philosophy of pragmatism.8
Most likely, we are doing ourselves few favors in the pop-science media by taking
this position, but we are willing to be cast as the stodgy ones.
As for the high-flying speculations of the “all mathematical structures are physi-
cally real” variety, we find that an observation by the philosopher William James rather
encapsulates our sentiments. The quote that follows is from a 1906 lecture. While a
modern multiversitarian would use newer terminology, it boils down to nothing essen-
tially different from the “Absolute” and the “mind of God” that had taken hold of the
“rationalists” at the time.
The more absolutistic philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction
that they never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer
us, the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught they
show us to the contrary, have made any one of a million other universes just
as well as this. You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion
of it. It is compatible with any state of things whatever being true here
below. [. . . ] Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about it, while the
usual theism is more insipid, but both are equally remote and vacuous.
24 What are good things to read about QBism?
While we’re quoting William James, it’s a good time to share a remark from his Prag-
matism (1907), which by itself is enough to elevate him to the first rank of intellectuals:
Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any rate be a universe
that lends itself to lengthy discourse.
Accordingly, there is no shortage of primary sources about QBism. The essay by Fuchs,
Mermin and Schack in the American Journal of Physics introduces the interpretation
with an emphasis on how it gives meaning to the standard mathematical formulation of
quantum theory [4]. Mermin [84, 12] and Fuchs [13, 85] have both written pieces that
go more in depth on the historical setting of QBism. Of these essays, Fuchs’s explains
more of the technical side of current research. Additional details of that technical work
8It also seems to us that arguments in this area tend to disconnect from actual scientific progress. For
example, it is a genre convention to quote Weinberg’s “prediction” of a small, nonzero cosmological constant
from anthropic reasoning [79]. Varying one parameter in isolation — a parameter that we have no good
reason to consider fundamental [80], at that — while holding all others fixed strikes us as having dubious
physical relevance. Moreover, Weinberg’s calculation requires as input the maximal observed redshift of a
galaxy [81]. His formula coughed up a decent answer when this was z = 4.4, but it fares dramatically worse
now that we have seen a galaxy at z = 11.1 [82]. Weinberg’s argument now gives a bound on the vacuum
energy density of about 5800 times the present cosmic mass density. This is three orders of magnitude larger
than the observed value, a ratio well into the regime where Weinberg himself says the cosmological constant
would be “so small that even the anthropic principle could not explain its smallness” [83].
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are presented in [3, 50]. Fuchs also discusses the genesis of QBism in the introduction
to the samizdat compilation [58]. Pretty much every question we have received about
QBism is addressed somewhere in [58], though not always answered with finality —
QBism is, as we said above, a project.
As for secondary sources, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a pretty
good article on QBism and related interpretations:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/
This was written by Richard Healey, who is not a QBist but has an interpretational
attitude that is in many ways QBism-adjacent. Being written for an SEoP audience,
it is heavier on the philosophical matters and gives less time to the technical research
that those matters have motivated.
If you want a whole book that you can carry around, Hans von Baeyer’sQBism: The
Future of Quantum Physics (Harvard University Press, 2016) is an accurate portrayal,
pitched to the interested-layperson audience.
(And incidentally, on the topic of books, Persi Diaconis and Brian Skyrms recently
released Ten Great Ideas about Chance, which lays out a school of thought about
probability that is pretty much aligned with the one QBism adopts. Diaconis and
Skyrms confine the quantum stuff to a single chapter, but they do recommend a David
Mermin essay on QBism as good reading [59].)
QBism has been written up both in New Scientist [86] and in Scientific Ameri-
can [87], though not terribly accurately in either case, thanks to the editorial pro-
cess [88, 89, 84]. A better treatment, albeit in German, appeared in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung [90]. Nature addressed it briefly in the context
of information-oriented reconstructions of quantum theory [91].
In June 2015, the pop-science website Quanta Magazine ran an interview with
Fuchs [2]. The accompanying profile is largely accurate, except for a figure caption
that implies QBism is a hidden-variable theory:
A quantum particle can be in a range of possible states. When an observer
makes a measurement, she instantaneously “collapses” the wave function
into one possible state. QBism argues that this collapse isn’t mysterious. It
just reflects the updated knowledge of the observer. She didn’t know where
the particle was before the measurement. Now she does.
A better caption would go more like the following:
In the textbook way of doing quantum physics, a quantum particle has a
“wave function” that changes smoothly when no one is looking, but which
makes a sharp jump or “collapse” when the particle is observed. QBism ar-
gues that this collapse isn’t mysterious. It just reflects the altered expecta-
tions of the observer. Before the measurement, she didn’t know what would
happen to her when she interacted with the particle. After the measurement,
she can update her expectations for her future experiences accordingly.
Originally, the subhead was also misleading; soon after the interview appeared, Quanta
fixed the subhead, but not the figure caption. So it goes.
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Later, Fuchs was interviewed for the Australian Broadcasting Company’s program,
The Philosopher’s Zone [92].
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